Security research, industry commentary, and stories from the field.

Kaeden (she/they)

Cyber Security Expert

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How I found that anyone could register on FIFA's public Agent Platform, gain access to the Football Data Platform's Streaming Management panel, and get RTMP ingest URLs and stream keys for every live FIFA World Cup 2026 camera feed. I then spent hours calling FIFA, MediaKind, HBS, CISA, and the FBI trying to get someone to pick up the phone.

How I found that anyone with a boarding pass photo can pull full passport numbers, home addresses, children's dates of birth, credit card details, and Known Traveler Numbers for every passenger on a Frontier Airlines booking. Reported March 3rd. Still live 105 days later.

Google Calendar has a setting that makes your entire calendar visible to anyone with your email address. Not just your availability. Full event details: titles, descriptions, attendees, Zoom links with passwords, and any documents linked in the description. All anyone needs is your email and a URL like calendar.google.com/calendar/u/0/[email protected]. No authentication. No notification to the owner. This whole rabbit hole started by accident. I was doing security research on MSCHF, the viral product company behind Big Red Boots and Blur, and ran an employee's email through GHunt, an OSINT tool. It flagged their Google Calendar as public. I clicked through, and suddenly I was looking at every upcoming product drop planned through 2025, internal meeting notes, and links to Google Docs, Spreadsheets, and Figma files that were viewable by anyone. One spreadsheet contained celebrity addresses.

Companies spend millions on firewalls, endpoint detection, and perimeter security. Then they give a part-time employee the keys to the kingdom. This is one of the most common patterns I find in my security research, and one of the least talked about. It's not about hackers breaking in from the outside. It's about what's already accessible from the inside, to people who were never supposed to see it.

There's a conversation I have over and over again. A company hires an agency to build their app. The app ships. It works. Everyone is happy. Then someone like me takes a look, and the whole thing falls apart. And you better hope it's someone like me, not someone who wants to exploit it. This isn't about where developers are located. Talented engineers exist everywhere. This is about a business model where agencies are incentivized to ship features fast, security isn't in the contract, and nobody checks the work.

I'm going to tell you something big cybersecurity doesn't want you to hear: the pentest you paid for probably wasn't a pentest. I've lost count of how many times I've disclosed critical vulnerabilities to a company, only to hear: "That's weird, we just had a pentest done and they said we were clean." At this point, hearing that a company recently passed a security assessment is almost a leading indicator that I'm about to find something bad.

A developer at a Fortune 500 company I work with had an attitude problem when it came to security. He didn't think it mattered much for the things he built. Nobody would bother attacking it. Nobody would be interested. It wasn't important enough to be a target. He was wrong. And I have two stories that prove it.

How I found critical vulnerabilities in Petlibro smart pet feeders allowing complete account takeover via broken OAuth, access to anyone's pet data, device hijacking, and private audio recordings - and how they're still leaving the auth bypass active for 'legacy compatibility' two months later.

How I found a verification bypass in Bandsintown that let anyone claim unclaimed artist pages with a single API call - including Rick Astley's 191k followers, their emails, and the ability to send push notifications as any artist.

How Lovense ignored critical vulnerabilities for 8+ years despite multiple researchers reporting them since 2017, exposed 11+ million users' emails through XMPP, allowed account takeovers without passwords, lied to researchers about fixes, and only patched after public exposure forced their hand.